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Res Judicata: New Standards for Evaluating the
Effect of a Change in Law After Judgment
.By Judith M. Rosenberg*
Res judicatal is the judicially-created2 doctrine which dictates that
once a matter has been litigated or has otherwise gone to judgment in a
court of competent jurisdiction, the controversy should be laid to rest
and the judgment should be given conclusive effect as to the parties to
that litigation. This doctrine serves important functions in the Ameri-
can system of jurisprudence.3 There will be times, however, when a
court must consider whether competing values indicate that a party
should be allowed to relitigate a claim despite the existence of a judg-
ment which purports to settle the matter forever.
Such a situation is presented when subsequent to a final judgment
in a civil case4 there has been a change in the law that was applied in
arriving at the judgment. This change in law may be the result of a
square holding declaring a statute unconstitutional5 or a rule of com-
mon law invalid.' The change in law might also be the result of a
* B.A., 1970, New York University. Member, Third Year Class.
1. The term res judicata will be used in this Note to express the general principle of
the finality of a judgment. As used, res judicata includes the concepts of merger, bar, and
collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Clark v. Lesher, 46 Cal. 2d 874, 299 P.2d 865 (1956); 4 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Judgments § 148 at 3293 (2d ed. 1971). Res judicata is
employed in its general sense in this Note for conceptual clarity only. There is little consis-
tency in the use of this term among writers and courts. See Comment, Res Judicata in
California, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 412, 412 (1952).
2. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 395 (1969).
3. See notes 64-71 & accompanying text infra. The doctrine ofresjudicata is funda-
mental in all systems of law that have contributed to American jurisprudence. Develop-
ments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 820 (1952).
4. The problem posed by a change in law after final judgment in a criminal case is
beyond the scope of this Note.
5. See, e.g., Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940);
Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 543 P.2d 593, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975). The problem
caused by a change in law effected by the legislature is beyond the scope of this Note.
6. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945); Moch v.
East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 548 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1977); Christian v. Jemison, 303
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more subtle process of changing judicial values.7 The effect of such a
change in law is that a different result might be reached should the case
be retried.
After such a change in law has occurred, a party may feel justified
in seeking to have a matter readjudicated in light of the new holding.
The new law may permit a theory of liability or defense that had been
disallowed in the prior suit. The opposing party will raise the defense
of res judicata to prevent the new determination. When the interests
of the parties or the public in a new adjudication override the interest
in a permanent resolution of the controversy, an exception to the doc-
trine of res judicata should be made and relitigation allowed.
At present, California courts lack a clear standard under which to
decide whether relitigation will be permitted after there has been a
change in law. This Note first will examine how California courts
have reacted to the problem caused by a change in law. Typically
courts have applied different analyses depending on whether the sec-
ond suit is brought on the same or a different cause of action as the
initial suit. This bifurcated treatment will be criticized. In the second
part of this Note, a test will be suggested under which a court can con-
front the problem caused by a change in law.
Judicial Reaction to the Change-in-Law Problem in California
California courts have adopted two lines of analysis in resolving
the problem caused by a change in law subsequent to a final judgment.
The analysis applied corresponds to whether the court deems a second
suit to be brought on the same or a different cause of action as the suit
which went to judgment. When the second suit is brought on the same
cause of action, a court will find that the merger or bar aspect of the
doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation as a procedural matter.
When the second suit is brought on the same issue or facts but on a
different cause of action, the collateral estoppel aspect of the res judi-
cata doctrine is the preclusionary defense raised. In a collateral estop-
pel situation, courts are more prone to look at the facts of the case
before determining whether a second adjudication is justified.
F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); Shelton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 66, 128 Cal. Rptr. 454
(1976).
7. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d
1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975); Cochran v. Union Lumber Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 423, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 632 (1972). In Cochran, the court characterized another court's interpretation of a
contract clause as "clearly erroneous" because of a misapplication of case law. 26 Cal. App.
3d at 428, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 635. It is suggested that the alleged error was not so "clear" to
the original court. What is perceived as error may be the result of a difference in values
which leads to differing interpretations of case law.
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It is suggested that this bifurcated approach places an unwarranted
emphasis on the definition of a cause of action. A test is needed that
will determine whether relitigation should be allowed after a change in
law regardless of whether the merger/bar or collateral estoppel preclu-
sionary defense is raised.
Merger and Bar
Scope of the Preclusion
The merger/bar aspect of the doctrine of res judicata applies when
the adjudicated matter consists of an entire cause of action.8 When
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiffs entire
claim is extinguished and merged into the judgment.9 When judgment
is given in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs claim is extinguished
and the judgment bars a subsequent action on that claim.10
When merger or bar prevents relitigation of a cause of action, the
preclusion applies not only to issues which were actually determined by
the judgment in the initial suit but also to any issue which was so rele-
vant to the subject matter of that action that it could have been raised
there. Merger or bar will encompass this related issue even though it
was neither expressly pleaded nor argued in the first suit."I "[TIhe rule
is that the prior judgment is resjudicata on matters which were raised
or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable."' 2
The scope of the merger/bar preclusion is sometimes expressed in
the form of a rule against splitting causes of action. 3 A plaintiff will
not be allowed to pursue the same claim in a second action merely
because he is prepared to present new evidence or theories which were
not presented in the first suit'4 or to seek new forms of relief not previ-
ously demanded. 5
Effect of a Change in Law
In Slater v. Blackwood,6 the California Supreme Court indicated
8. See notes 36-49 & accompanying text infra.
9. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942). A subsequent suit to enforce the judg-
ment is said to be on a new claim created by that judgment. Id. § 47, Comment a.
10. Id. § 48.
11. See, e.g., Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal. 2d 195, 202, 99 P.2d 652, 655 (1940).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-61.2 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978).
14. See Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593, 594-95, 126 Cal. Rptr.
225, 226-27 (1975).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
16. 15 Cal. 3d 791, 543 P.2d 593, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975).
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that a summary analysis will be applied in a change-of-law situation
when the second suit is brought on the same cause of action as the first.
The plaintiff in Slater had been injured in an automobile accident
while riding as a passenger in the defendant's car. At the time of her
first suit, the guest statute was in effect in California and negligence
would not have supported her personal injury suit against the defend-
ant. In order to comply with the statute, the plaintiff had to allege
either intoxication or wilful misconduct. Nonsuit was granted after the
plaintiffs opening statement on the ground that the evidence would not
support a recovery on this theory. The court of appeal rejected plain-
tiff s contention that the guest statute was unconstitutional and af-
firmed the trial court judgment. The California Supreme Court
denied Slater's petition for a hearing.
Approximately seven months after the judgment became final in
Slater's first action, the California Supreme Court decided the case of
Brown v. Merloz7 holding the guest statute unconstitutional as applied
to an injured, nonowner guest. If Slater had been able to bring her
lawsuit subsequent to the Brown v. Merlo decision, it is unlikely that
the nonsuit would have been granted. Accordingly, she instituted a
second action against the same defendant on a simple negligence the-
ory. The defendant's demurrer to the second complaint was sustained
without leave to amend on the ground that the original judgment was
res judicata and a bar to the second action. The Supreme Court of
California affirmed. 8
Under the supreme court's analysis in Slater, the key determina-
tion to be made when a party seeks to take advantage of a change in
law by bringing a second suit is whether the plaintiff is attempting to
relitigate the same cause of action. In Slater, the court noted that
under California law the invasion of one primary right, defined in
terms of the harm suffered, gives rise to one cause of action. 9 The fact
that the plaintiff brought her second suit on a legal theory which was
not available at the time of the initial suit was not determinative with
respect to a finding that she was attempting to split her cause of action.
Once it is determined that a party is attempting to relitigate the same
cause of action, public policy requires that the second suit be dismissed.
The principle that a final judgment is a bar to further proceedings
based on the same cause of action, the Slater court stated, is "necessary
17. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
18. The supreme court initially purported to decide the appeal on the theory of the
retroactivity of Brown v. Merlo, which had been urged by the plaintiff. Because the plaintiff
was a minor, the statute of limitations had not yet run and the theory of retroactivity was
thus available to her. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352 (West 1954). The bulk of the
opinion, however, spoke in terms of the res judicata defense.
19. 15 Cal. 3d at 795, 543 P.2d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
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to the well-ordered functioning of the judicial process.
' 20
This Note does not take issue with the result in Slater; it is the
reasoning that must be reevaluated. If courts were to allow relitigation
of a cause of action after every change in law the result would be a
flood of new actions in all cases in which the old law was controlling.
The problem is the summary analysis applied in Slater. The court
precludes relitigation of an adjudicated matter primarily on the basis of
its definition of a cause of action without considering whether the so-
cial policies that underlie the doctrine of res judicata will be well served
by its application in that case. The Slater court failed to consider the
reasons for allowing relitigation.21 As demonstrated below, when, af-
ter a change in law, a second suit is grounded on a different cause of
action, courts may allow relitigation on the basis that an unjust result
would be reached by applying a preclusion.
Collateral Estoppel
Scope of the Preclusion
When a party brings a second suit on a different cause of action
from a prior suit and seeks redetermination of an issue which was
raised in the first suit, the doctrine of collateral estoppe12 2 may be in-
voked to prevent a reconsideration of that issue. The preclusionary
effect of collateral estoppel is more limited than that of merger and bar.
The prior judgment operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication
in the second suit only with respect to those issues that were actually
litigated and necessarily determined by the judgment in the first
action.23
Effect of a Change in Law
When relitigation is attempted after a change in law in the context
of a second suit brought on a different cause of action, the analysis
applied by California courts in the face of a res judicata defense is
more protracted than that applied when the second suit is brought on
20. Id. at 797, 543 P.2d at 596, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
21. Exceptions to the rules of merger and bar are not without precedent in California.
Exceptions have been made, for example, when prior suits have yielded conflicting adjudi-
cations, Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 194 P.2d 1 (1948); when the plaintiff did not
have a fair opportunity to litigate in the initial suit, In re Marriage of Hight, 67 Cal. App. 3d
498, 136 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1977); and when changed facts and new conditions have intervened
between the first and second lawsuits, People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal. 2d 406, 196 P.2d
570 (1948); Guardianship of Snowball, 156 Cal. 240, 104 P. 444 (1909); McGaffey v.
Sudowitz, 189 Cal. App. 2d 215, 10 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1961).
22. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is also expressed by the term "estoppel by judg-
ment." See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).
23. Clark v. Lesher, 46 Cal. 2d 874, 880, 299 P.2d 865, 868 (1956).
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the same cause of action. In such a situation, courts will look behind
the res judicata doctrine to determine whether, under the facts of a
case, relitigation is justified. When collateral estoppel rather than
merger or bar is the defense raised in the second suit, courts 4 may
invoke section 70 of the Restatement of Judgments which provides:
Where a question of law essential to the judgment is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final personal judgment, the
determination is not conclusive between the parties in a subsequent
action on a different cause of action, except where both causes of
action arose out of the same subject matter or transaction; and in any
event it is not conclusive if injustice would result.25
Comment (f) further explains the "injustice" exception by stating that
the judgment will not be conclusive "if it would be unjust to one of the
parties or to third persons to apply one rule of law in subsequent ac-
tions between the same parties and to apply a different rule of law be-
tween other persons."2 6
The use of "injustice" as a basis for creating an exception to the
doctrine of res judicata allows a court to look at the facts of a particular
case to assess the equities involved before applying a preclusion. In-
voking Restatement section 70, courts have been unwilling to find a
preclusion when to do so would perpetuate an erroneous ruling in the
first suit27 or when the perceived public importance of the issue dictates
that the court reexamine a previous ruling of law. s
The California Supreme Court's reasoning in City of Los Angeles
v. City of San Fernando,29 a collateral estoppel case, presents a contrast
to the analysis employed by that court in Slater v. Blackwood." In
part, the controversy in City of Los Angeles concerned the plaintiff
city's "pueblo right" to certain water. The plaintiffs right was first
established in a declaratory judgment action to which two of the pres-
24. See, e.g., Cochran v. Union Lumber Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 423, 427-28, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 632, 635 (1972); Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860, 870, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 359, 365 (1970) (dictum); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Johansen, 270 Cal. App. 2d
824, 834-35, 76 Cal. Rptr. 174, 180 (1969).
25. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942).
26. Id. § 70, Comment f.
27. Cochran v. Union Lumber Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 423, 427-28, 102 Cal. Rptr. 632,
635 (1972); Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860, 870, 86 Cal. Rptr. 259, 265
(1970) (dictum); United States Fire Ins. Co., v. Johansen, 270 Cal. App. 2d 824, 834-35, 76
Cal. Rptr. 174, 180 (1969).
28. Chern v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 872-73, 544 P.2d 1310, 1313-14, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 110, 113-14 (1976); City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 230,
537 P.2d 1250, 1273, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 24 (1975); Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alco-
holic Beverage Control, 57 Cal. 2d 749, 758, 371 P.2d 758, 762, 22 Cal. Rptr. 14, 18 (1962).
29. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).




ent defendant cities were also parties. In the present suit for injunctive
relief, the existence of the pueblo right was relitigated and the trial
court found against the plaintiff. On appeal the plaintiff contended
that the declaratory judgment of the first suit was res judicata on the
issue of the existence of that right.
The supreme court avoided the application of res judicata alto-
gether. It first found that the two suits were based on different causes
of action because the first asked for declaratory relief while the second
sought injunctive relief.3" Because the collateral estoppel aspect of res
judicata was thus applicable, the court felt free to examine "the possi-
ble exception to this rule when the prior determination was of an issue
of law rather than offact."32  Looking at the facts of the case, the court
found two justifications for allowing relitigation of the pueblo right.
33
First, it would be unjust to hold two of the defendants bound to the
prior determination of the pueblo right "solely because of the doctrine
of collateral estopper' when the new party defendants would not be
bound thereby.34 Second, the court perceived a public interest attaching
to the proper determination of the conflicting claims of major public
31. 14 Cal. 3d at 227, 537 P.2d at 1271, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 22. In support of its finding
two causes of action, the court cited Langley v. Schumacher, 46 Cal. 2d 601, 297 P.2d 977
(1956). In Langley, the initial suit asked for a decree of annulment of a marriage on the
ground of fraud in its inducement. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had married her
while secretly intending never to consummate the union. Armed with the decree, the plain-
tiff instituted a second action for damages for fraud based on the same facts. The court
ruled that because the first suit was brought in equity and the second suit was brought for
damages at law, the harm remedied by the annulment was not the same as the harm reme-
died by the fraud action. The second suit was therefore held not to be barred under any
theory of res judicata. 46 Cal. 2d at 602-03, 297 P.2d at 979. Although Langley was cited
without discussion in City of Los Angeles, the implication seems to be that the declaratory
relief/injunctive relief distinction in that case is analogous to the law/equity distinction in
Langley.
32. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 227, 537 P.2d 1250, 1271, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 22. In order to apply
Restatement § 70, a court must find both that the second suit is based on a different cause of
action than the first and that the matter to be relitigated is one of law rather than one of fact.
Here, the court referred to its own historic treatment of the existence of a pueblo right as a
proposition of law rather than of fact as further justification for the possibility of creating an
exception to the collateral estoppel effect of the determination of the pueblo right in the first
suit. Id. at 229, 537 P.2d at 1272-73, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
33. The defendant cities first contended that application of res judicata with respect to
the determination of the pueblo right was precluded by an intervening change of law. The
court did not consider this claim because the intervening decision concerned a prescriptive
right and not a pueblo right, although it noted in dictum: "This contention might have merit
if the change of law were relevant to the issue on which res judicata is to operate." Id. at
228, 537 P.2d at 1272, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Under the reasoning of Slater v. Blackwood, 15
Cal. 3d 791, 543 P.2d 593, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975), this avenue would now seem to be
foreclosed. Although the intervening decision was not considered, the reexamination of the
pueblo right by the court in City ofLosAngeles represents a change in judicial values which
is included under the concept of a change of law in this Note.
34. 14 Cal. 3d at 230, 537 P.2d at 1273, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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entities to water resources.
The Cause of Action as a Red Herring
As Slater v. Blackwood and City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando illustrate, the decision as to whether the doctrine of res judi-
cata will yield to other expressions of public policy will depend initially
on a determination of whether the second suit is based on the same
cause of action as the first suit. It is suggested in this Note that the
cause of action determination diverts courts into an unnecessary ave-
nue of inquiry. Not only is the definition of a cause of action that has
been adopted in California only one of several possible definitions,36
but a court's decision as to what constitutes a cause of action within
that definition may be fairly debatable.37 Unless a party contends that
the matter to be relitigated was not actually and necessarily determined
by the first judgment, the fact that the second suit is brought on a tech-
nically different cause of action does not help to resolve the question of
whether relitigation should be allowed after a change in law.
Primary Right Theory of a Cause of Action
California courts embrace the "primary right" theory of a cause of
action. This theory flows from the concept that every judicial action
consists of the following elements: (1) a primary right which is pos-
sessed by the plaintiff and a corresponding primary duty owed by the
defendant; (2) a wrong done by the defendant which consists of a
breach of the primary right and duty; (3) remedial right of the plaintiff
and a remedial duty of the defendant; (4) a remedy or relief.38 The
first two elements constitute the cause of action.39 Under this theory, a
suit for bodily injuries arising out of an automobile accident will con-
stitute one cause of action regardless of the theory of the plaintiffs
case.40 In contrast, a suit for bodily injuries and for loss of consortium,
although arising out of one automobile accident in which a husband
and wife are involved, is brought on two causes of action.41 Similarly,
claims for personal injury and property damage will give rise to two
causes of action despite the fact that both were caused by the same
35. Id.
36. See Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 412, 415-19 (1952).
37. See note 49 & accompanying text infra.
38. 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Pleading § 22 at 1707 (2d ed. 1971).
39. Id.
40. See Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593, 594-95, 126 Cal. Rptr.
225, 226-27 (1975).
41. See Shelton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 66, 128 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1976).
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negligent act of the defendant.4 2
Transactional Theory of a Cause of 4ction
The primary right theory of a cause of action is only one of several
possibilities which could be adopted by a jurisdiction. 3 The American
Law Institute, for example, has proposed a "transactional" theory in its
draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Under this formula-
tion, the claim"' to be extinguished by merger or bar includes "all
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions,
out of which the action arose."4 A transaction for this purpose is to be
determined pragmatically with reference to facts which are related in
time, space, origin, and motivation, and which form a convenient trial
unit.
46
The transactional theory is effectively broader than the California
primary right theory of a cause of action. A suit for personal injuries
arising from a single accident will still constitute one cause of action
despite allegations of both simple and gross negligence.47 Under the
transactional formula, however, a plaintiff will be held to have pleaded
a single cause of action despite allegations of both personal injury and
property damage.
48
The Elusive Cause ofAction
Even within the framework of the California primary right theory
of a cause of action, it may be difficult to determine whether a party is
seeking to relitigate a cause of action. For example, the characterization
of the pueblo right dispute in City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando49 as two causes of action is debatable. In that case, the court
found that because the first complaint sought declaratory relief with
respect to the plaintiff's right to the water and the second complaint
sought injunctive relief, the two suits were based on different causes of
action. The basic harm suffered by the plaintiff city was, however, the
same in both suits: the defendant cities were not acting in accordance
42. See Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P.2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr.
431 (1969).
43. See Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 412, 415-19 (1952);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
44. A "claim" is the procedural equivalent of the California "cause of action."
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
46. Id. § 61, Comment b.
47. Id. § 61, Comment c.
48. Id.
49. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1; see notes 29-35 & accompanying
text supra.
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with the plaintiffs alleged pueblo right. The two actions differ, then,
in the form of relief requested, which should be no more determinative
with respect to whether one or two causes of action have been stated
than whether different theories of liability have been propounded.
An Unnecessary Inquiry
Deciding whether a second suit is brought on the same or a differ-
ent cause of action does not aid in solving the problem of when relitiga-
tion should be allowed after a change in law. The outcome of the cause
of action question only leads to a determination that either merger/bar
or collateral estoppel applies. When the parties to the two suits are the
same, and when there is no dispute that the matter to be relitigated has
been determined by the first judgment,5 0 it should not make a differ-
ence whether merger/bar or collateral estoppel applies.
In Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,' the Fifth Cir-
cuit expressed this conclusion in terms of simple logic:
We do not feel compelled to determine ... whether a supervening
change in the case law renders a subsequent claim a different cause
of action, thus making collateral estoppel rather than bar applicable,
or whether such a change constitutes an "altered circumstance" that
renders bar, itself, inapplicable. If public interest in giving effect to
changes in this important area of law outweighs [the defendant's] in-
terest in finality under one doctrine, one would logically conclude
that it would compel the same result under the other rule of
preclusion.
5 2
The draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments reaches a
similar result under section 68.11 The predecessor section in the first
Restatement limited the collateral estoppel effect of litigated issues to
situations when relitigation of the issue was sought in the context of a
different cause of action.54 Section 68 of the draft of the Restatement
Second states that when an issue55 is actually litigated and determined
by a valid final judgment, and that determination is essential to the
judgment, the judgment should be conclusive in a subsequent action
50. It should be emphasized that this discussion of the irrelevancy of the existence of
the same or a different cause of action in the second suit does not concern the situation
where there is an allegation that matters which could have been determined by the first
judgment, but were not raised, are now sought to be litigated in a second action. In such a
situation, the definition of a cause of action assumes importance.
51. 548 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1977).
52. Id. at 598.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
54. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
55. The Restatement Second also expands collateral estoppel from the first Restatement
to include issues of law in addition to issues of fact. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 68, Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
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between the parties whether that suit is on the same or a different cause
of action.
Following the logic of Moch and the Restatement Second, the de-
termination of whether relitigation of the plaintiffs right to damages in
Slater v. Rlackwood56 and the plaintiff city's right to an injunction in
City of Los Angeles v. CiQy of San Fernando57 is to be allowed would
proceed along identical lines. The primary consideration in both cases
is whether an exception to the doctrine of res judicata should be made
when there is a change in law subsequent to a fimaljudgment. A test to
determine when such an exception should be made is discussed in the
second part of this Note.
An Alternative to the California Solution to the Change-in-Law
Problem
The most simple solution to the problem caused by a change in
law subsequent to a final judgment would be to treat the doctrine of res
judicata as an immutable principle. Under this procedure, once a mat-
ter has been necessarily and actually determined by a final judgment,
relitigation would never be allowed despite arguments that injustice
would result. As this Note has demonstrated, 58 this solution is not ac-
ceptable to California courts.
On the other hand, to rely on vague notions of "injustice"59 in
determining when an exception to the doctrine of res judicata will be
made would be to undermine the stability of a final judgment which
the doctrine seeks to protect. Dissenting in Greenield v. Mather,60 Jus-
tice Traynor posed just such a caveat:
By what test are the trial and appellate courts of this state to
determine whether the circumstances of a case are rare enough to
justify a departure from the doctrine of res judicata? ... The
number of times this court has overruled earlier decisions is a re-
minder that principles of justice and policy are not static. No test
emerges from the turbid generalities of the majority opinion; in fact
it precludes any application of the doctrine of res judicata until the
courts look behind each judgment to the specific circumstances of
each case to determine whether those circumstances involve such
considerations of policy or justice as to require a departure from the
doctrine. The rule announced in the majority opinion therefore
defeats the whole purpose of the doctrine of res judicata by casting
the shadow of doubt on the finality of judgments.6 '
56. 15 Cal. 3d 791, 543 P.2d 593, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975).
57. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
58. See notes 16-21, 24-35 & accompanying text supra.
59. See notes 24-35 & accompanying text supra.
60. 32 Cal. 2d 23, 194 P.2d 1 (1948).
61. Id. at 37, 194 P.2d at 9 (Traynor, J., dissenting). The "rule" in the majority opinion
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To address Justice Traynor's fear of "casting the shadow of doubt
on the finality of judgments," while simultaneously preserving a court's
option to allow relitigation in compelling cases, this Note suggests a test
to be applied in situations when there has been a change in law subse-
quent to a final judgment. This test involves balancing the policy rea-
sons which underlie the doctrine of res judicata62 against the reasons
advanced in a given case for abrogating that doctrine in favor of reliti-
gation.63 Cases in which the balance will favor relitigation will be
rare. In those cases, however, when judicial and social interests would
be only minimally served by requiring the parties to rest on a prior
judgment, the balancing test would ensure a reasoned decision to allow
relitigation.
Policy Bases of the Res Judicata Doctrine
The first step in the proposed balancing test is to identify the social
values served by the doctrine of res judicata. Under the circumstances
of a given case, some of these values will weigh more heavily than
others, and some may not be served at all. Although countless ratio-
nales have been propounded by courts and writers, it is suggested that
the bases for the doctrine may be grouped conveniently under three
major headings: (1) benefits to the parties; (2) the functioning of the
judicial system as an entity; and (3) public opinion of the judicial
system.
Benefits to the Parties
A primary function of the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent a
party from being harassed by vexatious litigation.6' If a plaintiff were
free to press the same claim time and time again after judgment had
been rendered in favor of the other party, the economic and psycholog-
ical expense to the unfortunate defendant would be enormous. Fur-
ther, there would be the possibility that variations in judgments from
with which Justice Traynor took issue was the broad holding that "in rare cases a judgment
may not be res judicata, when proper consideration is given to the policy underlying the
doctrine .... In such cases it will not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends ofjustice or
important considerations of policy." Id. at 35, 194 P.2d at 8.
62. See text accompanying notes 64-71 infra.
63. See text accompanying notes 72-83 infra.
64. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 611 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 695, 527 P.2d 622, 628, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76 (1974);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); A.
VESTAL, RES JUDICIATA/PRECLUSION 9 (1969); 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
Pleading § 32 at 1716 (2d ed. 1971); Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44, 58 (1962); Steakley & Howell, Ruminations on
Res Judicata, 28 Sw. L.J. 355, 359 (1974); Developments in the Lan-Res Judicata, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 818, 820 (1952).
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one suit to the next would impose conflicting obligations on a party65
and that the public policy which favors certainty in legal relations
would be undermined by such a result.
66
Judicial Economy
A second major function of res judicata recognized by courts and
writers is the promotion of judicial economy.67 To allow repetitive liti-
gation would place an intolerable burden on the court system. As the
drafters of the Restatement Second have noted, "The simplification of
procedural systems, mounting calendar pressure and great increase in
the costs of litigation have understandably led courts to be progres-
sively more critical of needless repetition in resorting to judicial proc-
ess."68  On a practical note, one writer suggests that a point will be
reached in proceedings where it is unlikely that anything new and
worthwhile bearing on the merits will turn up, and that a second trial
may not be any better than the first.69
Public Opinion of the Judicial System
The third major rationale supporting the doctrine of res judicata
concerns the public's conception of the courts. Application of res judi-
cata serves to prevent inconsistent judgments whose existence under-
mines the integrity of the judicial system in a society which looks to the
courts to decide the "truth" in any given dispute.7" Similarly, the au-
thority of judicial decisions is jeopardized when courts readily recon-
65. See Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1042 (1971).
66. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 at 532 (2d ed. 1977).
67. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 611 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686,
695, 527 P.2d 622, 628, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76 (1974); A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION
10-11 (1969); 3 B. WITK N, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Pleading § 32 at 1716 (2d ed. 1971);
Steakley & Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata, 28 Sw. L.J. 355, 359 (1974); Developments
in the La--Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 818 (1952).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Foreward at vii (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973). But cf. Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1971) (Res
judicata and collateral estoppel not really explicable in terms of saving time by not allowing
reltigation when compared to the burdens of elaborate discovery and other pretrial prac-
tices, trials, and appeals.).
69. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.1 at 518 (1965).
70. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 201 (1932); People v. Taylor, 12 Cal. 3d 686, 695, 527
P.2d 622, 628, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76 (1974); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
11.2 at 532 (2d ed. 1977); A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 12 (1969); Developments
in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952). But cf Hazard, Res Nova in
Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1971) (Eliminating inconsistent adjudications
does not weigh heavily in maintaining public confidence when compared to the public's
perception of the undermining effects of corruption and delay in the court system.).
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sider them.7!
Interests to be Served by Allowing Relitigation: Some Suggestions
After a court has determined how the policies which underlie the
res judicata doctrine will be served in a given case, the second part of
the balance will be analyzed. Under the second part of the balancing
test, a court will articulate the interests to be served by allowing reliti-
gation. Factors which may be considered here include the interests of
nonparties, the degree of reliance placed on the first judgment, and the
quality of the rights of the parties which are involved.
Interests of Nonparties
A court's decision not to allow relitigation after a change in law
may have an impact on the public in general or on a more limited class
of nonparties to the suit.72 The interest of nonparties may be affected
when issues in the suit involve a constitutional dimension73 or in situa-
tions when the business activity of a litigant is controlled by an inter-
pretation of law which has changed subsequent to the initial
determination.74 In Christian v. Jemison,75 for example, suit was
brought to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance which required ra-
cial segregation in buses. Because allegations of the unconstitutional-
ity of the ordinance were improperly pleaded, the constitutional
question was not reached by the court. After the United States
Supreme Court had declared such segregation to be unconstitutional,
some of the same plaintiffs again brought suit to enjoin enforcement of
the ordinance, and relitigation was allowed.76  A balancing of the so-
cial policies which would be supported by requiring the parties to rest
on the first judgment in a case like Jemison and those policies which
71. Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1042 (1971).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(e) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
As an example of the potential effect of ajudgment on nonparties, the drafters pose a case in
which an agency of the government brings an action for the protection or relief of certain
persons or of a segment of the public. Id. § 68.1, Comment h.
73. See, e.g., Bronson v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975); Christian v.
Jemison, 303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
74. See, e.g., Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1975); Kinnear-
Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1968); National Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co. v. Parkinson, 136 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1943); Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal. 2d 749, 371 P.2d 758, 22 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1962).
75. 303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
76. The Fifth Circuit rested its decision to allow relitigation on "'the general rule that
res judicata is no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there
has been an intervening decision or a change in law creating an altered situation.'" Id. at
55 (citations omitted). The general rule articulated by the Fifth Circuit is not followed in




would be advanced by allowing relitigation of the invalidity of the or-
dinance would most likely lead a court to a decision to disallow the res
judicata defense.77
Reliance on the First Judgment
A second factor which may be considered in favor of relitigation is
the degree of reliance placed on the first adjudication by the parties
themselves. In Cochran v. Union Lumber Company,78 for example, a
plaintiff sought to offensively invoke collateral estoppel to bind a de-
fendant to an interpretation of a clause in a contract which had previ-
ously been litigated between the defendant and another party. A
California court found the previous interpretation to be erroneous be-
cause of a misapplication of case law. The court declined to apply
collateral estoppel, noting that were it to require the defendant com-
pany to be bound by the previous judgment that party would suffer a
competitive disadvantage with respect to other companies which would
be free to litigate the issue.79
Even if the parties to both suits were identical in a situation such
as the one in Cochran, the same result might obtain if by the time of the
second suit neither party had relied to its detriment on the first inter-
pretation of the contract language. In such a case the argument that
the doctrine of res judicata is designed to protect the parties to the liti-
gation8" would be weakened while the argument in favor of relitigation
would be strengthened. On the other hand, had one party relied on the
previous judgment to its detriment, the case for upholding the res judi-
cata defense would be strengthened.8'
Quality of the Rights to be Protected
A third factor to be considered involves the quality of the rights of
the parties to be protected by the application or nonapplication of res
judicata. In a footnoted discussion in Monroe v. Trustees ofthe Cali-
fornia State Colleges,82 the California Supreme Court said that it could
77. In contrast, a case such as Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 543 P.2d 593, 126
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1975), would not embody such important social policies and therefore, on
balance, a court would not allow relitigation. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
78. 26 Cal. App. 3d 423, 102 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1972).
79. Id. at 428, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
80. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
81. See Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: .4 Question of Judicial
Responsibility, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 533, 561 (1977). Former Chief Justice Traynor suggests
that a factor in the decision to apply a court's ruling prospectively would be when the hard-
ship on the party who has relied on the old rule outweighs the hardship on the party who is
denied the benefit of the new rule.
82. 6 Cal. 3d 399, 406 n.3, 491 P.2d 1105, 1109, 99 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1971).
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independently find no case where the retroactive application of a civil
decision was held to revive a cause of action on which the statute of
limitations had already run. The court noted, however, that in the
criminal field courts may grant the benefits of a decision to imprisoned
people whose time for challenging their convictions had expired. The
court attributed this practice, in part, to the importance of the pris-
oner's interest in personal liberty. The court noted the possibility that
the relief afforded a party to a civil action from the continuing disabili-
ties of an earlier civil decision might be analogous to the release of a
prisoner through habeus corpus under a fully retroactive criminal deci-
sion. Situations supporting this analogy would be rare,83 but in com-
parison to the interest of the opposing party to a civil suit there could
be circumstances when a party seeking relitigation has been denied so
fundamental a right in the initial suit that a new determination would
be justified.
Conclusion
In response to changes in policy and attitudes about justice, a court
will overrule its prior decisions or decide a matter differently than it
would have at an earlier time. Such a change in law may be reason to
allow relitigation of a matter which has once been laid to rest. In mak-
ing its decision to allow relitigation, however, a court must be mindful
of the values which the doctrine of res judicata protects.
In considering whether a new adjudication of a matter will be al-
lowed after a change in law, California courts presently are diverted
into a discussion of whether a second suit is grounded on the same
cause of action as the first suit. This Note has suggested that the reso-
lution of this issue is of secondary importance. The crux of the court's
analysis should be whether the policies served by the doctrine of res
judicata are of such importance that they should be protected in light of
the values which will be served by relitigation in a given case.
Situations in which the balance of equities will tip in favor of relit-
igation will be rare. Some of the factors that should weigh in this bal-
ance have been suggested in this Note. Inflexible application of res
judicata may lead to unwarranted hardship. Judicial restraint in creat-
83. In Monroe v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 6 Cal. 3d 399, 491 P.2d 1105, 99
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1971), the plaintiff was discharged from his position as a professor for refusal
to sign a loyalty oath. The loyalty oath requirement was later declared to be unconstitu-
tional. Plaintiff then sought reinstatement as well as back pay and pension benefits accru-
ing from the time of his dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
reinstatement and noted that the relief thus afforded from the "continuing disabilities of the
earlier unconstitutional action is somewhat analogous to the release of a prisoner. . . under
a 'fully retroactive' criminal decision." Id. at 407 n.3, 491 P.2d at 1110, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
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ing exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata will ease the fear that the
potential of exceptions will become "an invitation to all unsuccessful
litigants to relitigate their cases."84
84. Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 36, 194 P.2d 1, 9 (1948) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
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